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1 |  INTRODUCTION
A warm cup of tea, some now forgotten software disassembly,1 a hum of the computers in the background, sun-
light streaming through the glass façade. Adam2 ran into the malware analysis laboratory at around 2.15pm, full 
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Abstract
On one June afternoon in 2017, during an autoethnography of a malware analysis and 
detection laboratory, NotPetya quickly caused destruction. This malware has since been 
characterised as a key geopolitical event in cybersecurity, causing billions of dollars 
in damage as it rendered inoperable computers across the world. The hunt to identify 
those who had written NotPetya occurred almost immediately. However, this paper 
rearticulates this event through grammar, in a close reading of computation, to urge 
for a more- than- human reading of cybersecurity. By exploring the written propositions 
of the hackers, various computational materials – including hardware, code, and ma-
chine learning algorithms – as well as their ecologies, cybersecurity is understood to be 
part of an ecology of language- practice. Engaging with N. Katherine Hayles’ study of 
non- human cognition and choice, computation has an ability to read, interpret, and act, 
and thus intervene. NotPetya is thus not only a tool of hackers but is a political actor 
which, alongside others, transformed the contours of the geopolitics of cybersecurity. 
By focusing on grammars, geopolitics does not wholly derive from the (white, male, 
rational) hacker, analyst, or intelligence agent, but rather from a distributed set of actors 
that speak to one another. Grammars permit a nuanced appreciation of cyber- attacks, 
the hacker's handling of computational cognition and choice, as well as conceptualis-
ing the relation between author and computation and the risks of machine learning. 
Cybersecurity, through grammar, then becomes one of co- authorship where security 
is not only performed by humans but is contorted by an alien politics of computation.
K E Y W O R D S
autoethnography, computation, cybersecurity, machine learning, more- than- human, NotPetya
2 |   DWYER
of analysts sitting in rows of desks analysing software for maliciousness, writing detections. He was breathless, 
speaking fast. 
(Research diary)
On 27 June 2017, I first encountered the malicious software NotPetya. This was during a seven- month autoethnography of the 
malware analysis and detection laboratory at the UK headquarters of Sophos in Oxfordshire, which provides protection against 
malware.3 Here, I immersed myself in analysing and detecting what are sometimes known as computational viruses and worms 
across various computational infrastructures supporting big data analysis and visualisation, the maintenance of “engines” to distrib-
ute detections to customers, as well as its office space, air- conditioning for servers, on segregated and “safe” networks. NotPetya 
spread fast that day, with Adam running into the laboratory, Twitter exploding with snippets of news, amid shouting across rows of 
computers and malware analysts. We posted information on a shared page and a detection was quickly distributed to customers. It is 
this close working with malware at Sophos that informs my thinking of cybersecurity as a more- than- human endeavour. That is, the 
various materials, the analysts, the hackers, all perform together to produce what I argue are grammars.
NotPetya became infamous through its propagation from a modified update to a popular accounting software used in Ukraine, 
wiping and rendering inoperable computers across the country, eventually affecting international businesses from FedEx to the 
pharmaceutical giant Merck. This was subsequently attributed to the Russian military (the GRU) amid claims of the violation 
of Ukraine's sovereignty. It also exposed vulnerabilities in the everyday, yet geopolitically essential, shipping business Mærsk, 
as the attack limited systems processing the loading and unloading of cargo ships.
This paper delves into NotPetya as grammar to rearticulate how we attribute responsibility, and understand the geography 
of cyber conflict and the practices of cybersecurity. Through exploring grammars as a set of language practices that interweave 
hackers and computational cognition across various ecologies, I demonstrate alternative relationships in cybersecurity that por-
tend to both the complexity of the enactment of attacks and defending against these. Rather than understanding cyber- attacks 
as linear relationships between hacker intent and resultant impacts through malware as tool or collateral damage, computation 
instead becomes a political actor and intervenes in what is possible. As computational capacity has grown, as demonstrated 
through machine learning algorithms, cybersecurity must recognise what grammars can actualise in more- than- human ways, 
where computation “speaks” back. For geopolitics, this means that computation cannot be treated as a tool exclusively awaiting 
human activation, but instead as an actor that shapes geopolitics.
This paper then opens this conversation by: (1) introducing the utility of grammars for understanding computation's role 
in geopolitics and cybersecurity; (2) offering a reading of NotPetya that continues throughout the paper; (3) detailing what 
a geopolitics of computation through an understanding of grammars may look like; (4) explaining how computation can be 
understood as a political actor through its ability for cognition and choice; and concluding by (5) assessing the implications of 
greater risks for cybersecurity and geopolitics made possible through grammars.
2 |  ARTICULATING GRAMMARS
NotPetya has been described as “the most devastating cyberweapon in the history of the internet” (Greenberg, 2019, p. 180). 
Yet, like many readings of malware, Greenberg's Sandworm locates the locus of NotPetya's agency with its authors. I instead 
diverge from such a human- dominant perspective to offer a computational language- practice, consisting of texts and perfor-
mance, as grammar. Through a non/representational appreciation of language (Daya, 2019), I understand malware to per/form 
particular grammars by adapting the interpretations of McQuillan (2017) and Amoore (2020). In my reading, grammars consist 
of three primary elements: (1) written propositions from computational “texts” – hardware, software, and code – that guide 
the parameters of possibility through their arrangement by authors (Amoore, 2013, 2020, pp. 9– 13; Wittgenstein, 1969); (2) a 
more- than- human politics through computational, non- human cognition by developing on N. Katherine Hayles’ (2017, 2019) 
work; and (3) how various environments, politics, and other geopolitical arrangements – henceforth ecologies (Hörl, 2017) 
– condition what is per/formed.
Grammars are momentary alignments based on shared language- practices, which render cybersecurity and geopolitics 
more- than- human. To demonstrate this, I trace NotPetya, crisscrossing the propositions of Russian hackers, how they are 
read, interpreted, and acted on through computational cognition, as well as various ecologies, including a blackout in Ghana. 
This is in order to argue that computation has a capacity to be political (Thornton, 2017) through its cognitive abilities. When 
propositions are written by hackers and then processed through computational cognition in different ecologies, computation 
interprets and per/forms choices. Grammars then link representational computational texts such as software, hardware as ma-
terial artefacts, and ecologies that simultaneously form new relations and potentials that cannot be wholly known in advance. 
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Yet, computational cognition and their resultant choices should not be considered the same as a reflexive human practice of 
decision, as much as this is always partial and multiple. Rather computational choices should be understood as alien (Fazi, 
2019), where grammars cannot be opened up to our representational forms of scrutiny. Grammars – in more- than- human ways 
– produce arrangements of who and what counts in unequal, and sometimes racist and enduring colonial formations (Elwood, 
2020; Mbembe, 2017; Noble, 2018). So, although here I turn my attention to cybersecurity, one element in the task of account-
ing for computation as a geo/political actor is to develop new methods to address their “outputs” as choices that are not reduced 
to representational adjustment of propositional arrangement.
As I witnessed at Sophos, it is not always clear how propositions in the “texts” of malware lead to certain choices and thus 
grammars. For cybersecurity, this has important implications, such as when a human should be held responsible for a grammar 
(e.g., in attribution, see Egloff & Wenger, 2019), or how modifying an ecology can assist in defending against an offensive cyber 
operation. As Louise Amoore argues in Cloud Ethics (2020), it is not possible to simply read the code of machine learning algo-
rithms to adequately identify a point where the propositions (the learning data and software) lead to a certain output. I further 
argue that grammars, at least partially, are not open to representational examination, due to computational language- practice 
obscured by differing forms of non- human cognition based on calculative modes, inaccessible to human representation(s). This 
means that we can never truly grasp the more- than- human politics of a cyber- attack or machine learning- informed detection, 
but only glimpse at its grammars. That means cybersecurity is full of risks, unknown parts, and this is only becoming more 
so as “automated” systems are deployed. When thinking of malware, grammars “work” – attacks, compromise, and intrusion 
happen all too frequently – so this is not a claim that computational cognition and its choices are excessive. Propositions matter, 
they have meaning, but only come to matter in certain performances, in certain places, at certain times to per/form grammars.
3 |  NOTPETYA
NotPetya caused such great damage across Ukraine and beyond because it writes over crucial code in the “master boot re-
cord” (MBR), preventing the computer from booting up. On that Tuesday morning in June, NotPetya was released through a 
backdoor4 to the Ukrainian accounting software, M.E. Doc, causing havoc across the country as it swiftly propagated across 
internal corporate networks. For many, conducting attribution and understanding its geopolitical implications – from inter- state 
conflict, the disruption of global shipping, to the fragility of “critical national infrastructure” – would be the totality of this 
event. However, by considering NotPetya as per/forming a grammar, it is possible to offer a more- than- human and wholly more 
unsettling account.
The hackers, in this more- than- human reading, arranged a set of propositions to infiltrate M.E. Doc in order for its distri-
bution as part of a “routine” update (albeit another grammar in itself!). NotPetya could then enter a computer and its network 
to per/form in these ecologies. NotPetya then read these as it encountered different malware detection products. This included 
Kaspersky (“avp.exe”), which if read by NotPetya, was interpreted based on its propositions, and acted based on these to pre-
vent the wiping of the computer's MBR. Here, we can ask if the hackers wished to protect certain computers – the ecologies 
– of those using Kaspersky? Likewise, if the Norton (“ns.exe”) or Symantec (“ccSvcHst.exe”) detection products were read and 
interpreted, NotPetya would not use EternalBlue5 (Sood & Hurley, 2017) to propagate. Was this because EternalBlue would 
have been read and interpreted by these detection products, leading them to dectect NotPetya and stop it per/forming its gram-
mars? At Sophos, I read these tightly defined propositions written by the hackers; but this is not, and cannot be, the whole story.
As I have hinted at, NotPetya did not per/form its grammars in isolation but across a mêlée of other computational grammars 
that, partially, form a broader ecology of materials that include business investment decisions, efforts to segregate networks, 
and electricity infrastructures. This then makes it difficult to ascertain where and how (geo)politics emerges. NotPetya did not 
propagate much beyond internal networks, as the hackers wrote propositions to shape grammars, but not exactly how they come 
to per/form across ecologies. Therefore, when discussing malware, who and what does the geopolitics; is it the hackers, the 
lack of defensive segregation of (computational) ecologies that resulted in the loss of billions of dollars (see US Department of 
Justice, 2020; US$1bn), or rather was it the alien politics of computational cognition? It is in the formation of grammars that 
we see the geopolitical arise, where political actors (human and computational) work with and through the ecologies that they 
are interwoven with. By understanding this as a language- practice, because there is a reading of texts, their interpretation and 
action by and through computation, a wider polity of cybersecurity and geopolitics emerges. The hackers had an approximate 
idea where their propositions would intersect with computational cognition and their resultant choices, but not where it would 
precisely take them. It is unlikely that the hackers explicitly intended to severely damage the shipping and logistics business 
Mærsk or FedEx, but the range of propositions, computational cognition, and choices, as well as the ecology came together to 
lead to these grammars of “collateral damage.”
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4 |  A GEOPOLITICS OF COMPUTATION
Critical geopolitics has attended extensively to language, representation, and discourse (Müller, 2008). This paper advocates 
for computation to be similarly understood through a per/formative language- practice alongside an embrace of materiality. 
As Vicky Squire notes, critical geopolitics has conventionally focused on the representational and discursive, and calls for an 
embrace of more- than- humanism that acknowledges “the limits of a critical geopolitics that over- invests the representational, 
cultural, and the interpretive dimensions of geopolitics” (2015, p. 140). This perspective has developed alongside an embrace 
of the role of materials and the agency of “things” through new materialisms (Bennett, 2010; Dittmer, 2013), such as in feminist 
work on embodiment (Sharp, 2020). Materiality is, however, crucial to the potential for language and discourse in geopolitics 
(Anderson, 2018). Therefore, this paper embraces Squire's (2015) call for a focus on more- than- humanism in geopolitics along-
side how the materiality and language- practices of computation offer a potential for it to be understood as a geo/political actor.
A critical geopolitics of computation can then be understood as both a study of materiality and language- practice. 
Computation, I argue, consists of various texts, both representational and not. In Of Grammatology, Derrida notes how “the 
entire field covered by the cybernetic program will be the field of writing” (2016, p. 9) and that, according to Butler, “writing 
… offers a nonanthropocentric way of understanding language by virtue of its distinction from speech” (Butler, 2016, p. xv). 
Computational texts then may be considered representational if they contain “human- readable” propositions, such as in soft-
ware and code, and crucially texts that are not “readable,” including hardware. This perspective for computation and cybersecu-
rity to be regarded as a series of texts is most eloquently described in Justin Joque's discussions on cyberwar in Deconstruction 
Machines (2018). Thus, how does the material of a binary logic gate, through to the code of a machine learning algorithm, come 
to be understood as both material and language- practice? This can be understood through both a capacity to materially afford 
properties (Davis & Chouinard, 2016), such as “non- readable” propositions such as processing power, and also a language- 
practice whereby software and code offer a set of “human- readable” propositions that condition the parameters of possibility 
as much as the latter can be interpreted as material. As various propositions interact with one another through computation's 
cognition, new vulnerabilities, for instance, may emerge – or be “discovered” – that permit a point of entry for malware or in 
launching a cyber- attack.
This complex array of computational materialities that form contemporary digital, electronic computation then also provide 
the basis for interaction with other grammars to form ecologies and thus shape geo/politics. Ecologies consist of multiple layers 
of non/representational texts, which must be read, interpreted, and acted on, alongside a range of other (non- computational) 
grammars and geo/politics. Parikka understands a computational text to be “defined by its motion and rest, speeds and slow-
ness, but also its affects, i.e. its relations with other bodies” (2010, p. 124). This then opens up the relation between author(s) 
and their computational texts to per/form with unknown others in ecologies. For example, when NotPetya encountered the 
ecologies of Mærsk, the total damage cost in the region of US$300m (World Economic Forum, 2018). Yet, in some “luck,” 
one essential computational material in its IT infrastructure (ecology) was able to be recovered: a domain controller, which 
stores information on who can access a system. Those domain controllers that had been connected to the internal network had 
all been wiped by NotPetya's grammar. As Greenberg details, however, at “some point before NotPetya struck, a black- out 
had knocked [a] Ghanaian machine off- line, and the computer remained disconnected from the network. It thus contained the 
singular known copy of the company's domain controller data left untouched by the malware – all thanks to a power outage” 
(2019, p. 194). NotPetya's grammar was unable to actualise at that moment and place as it intersected with other geopolitical 
formations, such as postcolonial energy infrastructures (MacLean et al, 2016), global shipping, and beyond. Mærsk supports 
much international trade, which when disrupted has adverse geopolitical consequences. In this case, they were averted by this 
ecology and associated geopolitics; it also demonstrates how cybersecurity is intimately tied to coloniality, in ways that may be 
unexpected. Therefore, ecologies are no less important and extend beyond computation, meaning that computational grammars 
do not just exist in the “cyber domain” or “cyberspace” but are always threaded with other materials and ecologies that may at 
first glance appear banal or be initially dismissed as part of the everyday.
Mærsk's ecologies however still permitted NotPetya's grammar to quickly per/form a destructive act. The reason to linger on 
such a point is because there is no flat plane to computation – there are multiple human actors and their propositions, computa-
tions, ecologies, and their respective grammars at each instance – there is no such “singular” event (as much as NotPetya may be 
popularly perceived as such), but instead there is an incessant per/forming. Therefore, one cannot speak solely of one grammar 
as much as the world is not a singular thought or thing. Even one computer is made up of collectives of propositions; streams, 
big data, multiple software authors, borrowed code routines, and more. Assessing the grammars of cybersecurity and their 
geopolitics is not one restricted to the study of disassembly (the lowest human- readable code that I analysed at Sophos) nor of 
a singular malware like NotPetya, but interrogating grammars as a language- practice that can only ever be partially understood 
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through studying computational cognition, propositions, and ecologies. Studying cybersecurity and geopolitics then requires an 
appreciation of a terrain that is complex, differentiated, and a fascinating, more- than- human endeavour.
5 |  COMPUTATION AS A POLITICAL ACTOR
To further explicate the argument for computation as an explicit geo/political actor rather than agent or tool, I develop N. 
Katherine Hayles’ (2017, 2019) work on non- human cognition and choice, explored elsewhere in geography (Lynch & Del 
Casino, 2020). According to Hayles, the world is composed of “cognizers” who read, interpret, and make choices on signs, 
and those who do not, “noncognizers.” The former includes plants, humans, and animals, and crucially, computation. For ex-
ample, during NotPetya's propagation, it was able to read the ecology and, accordingly, interpret this to make a choice, based 
on its propositions, on whether to infect a particular computer. This is different to noncognizers who do not interpret and make 
choices, such as ocean waves, rocks, and non- computational technologies (that may still afford certain ecological properties). 
Hayles then distinguishes computation from other forms of technology as it actively reads, interprets, and acts on signs. Thus, 
computers can create meanings through processes of sign exchange (2019), and in my reading be political actors. This does 
not mean that computation is on a plane of equivalence to other cognizers, but that its choices are made through alternative 
signs, alternative forms of language- practice. These choices are not reflexive and cannot be compared to our notions of deci-
sion as they are calculative rather than socially informed (Dwyer, 2020), but rather, I argue, provide a foundation for politics 
– defined as a capacity to read, interpret, and act on signs. Nor does it mean that computation is automatically intelligent. At the 
“low” levels of electronic circuitry, choices are barely distinguishable from the material proposition expressed in its hardware 
arrangement. Alone it would be a noncognizer, but through its performance as a language- practice, reading and interpreting of 
signs of multiple materials, choices can be made. Humans likewise work in non/representational ways, with choices that are 
(pre)cognitive, making choices that do not necessarily correspond to popular understandings of the term, where decisions are 
but one high- level, reflexive, and abstracted form of choice.
As computation becomes increasingly abstracted from hardware (proposition built on proposition), with big data feeding 
unsupervised machine learning algorithms, a greater range of recursive cognition is possible, with more choices possible. This 
increases the potential for geo/political action where political actors are those who are choice- makers. I am not claiming that 
computational choice is new, but that its cognitive abilities have thus far been relatively limited. This means that we have ig-
nored its political potential, as much as it is not like our politics either. As Fazi (2019) claims, computation is an alien thought 
as it (re)cognises the world on a different basis to us. That is because its recognition of representational language, for instance, 
does not follow humanly socially negotiated modes. As much as new materialism has convincingly advocated for more expan-
sive notions of agency for agents as varied as electricity and infrastructures within, and beyond, geography (Whatmore, 2006), 
it too often blunts an engagement with radical alterity (Jazeel, 2014). Claiming that computation recognises the world – and 
makes choices – through a calculative rather than an embodied, affectual mode is then also alien in the most radical political 
form. “Organicism” (Hui, 2019) has placed technology below “natural” things, leading to a neglect of computation's capacity 
to engage in language- practice, yet one still ferociously compared to our intelligence through cybernetic informational com-
parison (Hayles, 1999). These both suggest that computation is less complex and must also be inherently knowable due to its 
foundation on mathematical logic (Fazi, 2020). Grammars do not necessarily correspond to our assessments, recognition, or 
sense- making, but malware are actors, not simply agents, due to their calculative interpretation of signs, requiring an assessment 
of how computation has differing forms of (re)cognition that make it alien to our representations, language, and even politics.
6 |  A CYBERSECURITY OF GRAMMARS
This paper does not seek to understand language- practice through grammar, but rather understand grammars through language- 
practice with propositions per/formed by computation. Grammars are not structures, they are teeming full of sign exchanges, 
interactions that are affective, organic, and non- organic, crafting new forms of geo/politics. This resonates with Bernard 
Stiegler’s (1998) study of grammatisation – a theory and history of writing – where technology becomes an extension of human 
capability. However, I broaden beyond Stiegler to suggest that computation is not only an extension, but an actor with a distinct 
more- than- human alien politics. These politics can sometimes be easily rendered negligible amid the “grander” geopolitics of 
cybersecurity, but they are quintessential to our modern lives. Malware exhibit some subtlety to these relationships, in how 
they are still closely tied to the proposition of the hacker. Even here though, through grammars, computation and NotPetya are 
not tools but more- than- human endeavours. Yet as unsupervised “deep” machine learning algorithms increase in recursion, 
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computation's cognitive ability to read, interpret, and act then transforms its capacity to participate and shape geopolitics. This 
then should be the central focus of developments for “automated” security, such as in the application of machine learning to 
cybersecurity in “Cyber AI” (Buchanan et al., 2020).
Sophisticated hackers could then be understood as co- collaborators. They arrange their propositions for their intended audi-
ence with malicious intent (working with computational cognition and anticipated ecologies). When writing malware, they use 
computational cognition and choice to their advantage. For example, NotPetya's main propagation method was a modified ver-
sion of the “mimikatz” hacking tool. This reads the ecology of the computer, and associated business networks, interprets the 
signs it reads, in order to identify credentials. These credentials are used to act to access another computer using the grammars 
of other legitimate system tools. As the analysts at Sophos noted, NotPetya's propositions had clear omissions in decryption 
routines, meaning it was impossible to decrypt the MBR and restore the computer. It is possible to understand malware through 
proposition and to assess some of the representative intentions of the hackers through the lens of conventional critical geopol-
itics. Yet, this is never the whole story, as how computation and malware come to per/form grammars is always dependent on 
computational cognition across multiple ecologies. This is a more- than- human, alien, geo/politics.
I thus offer a more- than- human sensibility to cybersecurity and geopolitics, through NotPetya, to situate computation and 
its various materialities as political actors through grammars. Rather than understanding the geopolitical consequences of 
NotPetya through collateral damage or unintended effects – grammars enable this to be interpreted and rendered as a political 
collaboration. Rather than writing- off responsibility of hackers and other actors in cybersecurity, geopolitical research requires 
even more sensitivity to the dangers and risks of computational cognition. We are responsible for propositions, but we do not 
have explicit control of the geopolitical consequences due to this alien politics. This calls for cybersecurity research to address 
when and how computational grammars come into actualisation, whom they affect, and how they may perpetuate or transform 
harms. Those in cybersecurity – including those I witnessed through the autoethnography of malware analysis and detection 
– are co- collaborators in writing new worlds, making possible that which was not before. Cybersecurity is always dealing with 
a more- than- human world of language- practice, per/forming grammars. These include intrusions around COVID- 19 vaccines, 
hacking of states through supply chains, conflicts in Ukraine, and the everyday endpoint detection engines protecting our 
computers. Therefore, new developments that increase computational cognition in cybersecurity must be aware of the doubt 
introduced (Amoore, 2020) that is inherent in this alien politics, which must not be written- off as the error, bug, or glitch.
Thus, the three strands of grammar – proposition, computational cognition, and ecology – weave together more- than- 
human relationships between authors and computation in a language- practice that is performative and non/representational. 
Computation, as a cognizer, exhibits alternative (re)cognition by reading, interpreting, and acting on signs that cannot be wholly 
opened nor understood. The 2020 compromise of the IT infrastructure business SolarWinds – which provides services to many 
US government departments (FireEye, 2020) – may raise questions over what grammars were made possible and how ecologies 
may be adjusted (are outsourced infrastructures desirable, for instance?). There is no resolution to computational cognition and 
its choices by trying to fit these into representational modes either. Some machine learning algorithms may be able to give 
“partial accounts” (Amoore, 2020), but how closely can we hold hackers, or the IT department at Mærsk, responsible for the 
full geopolitical implications of the grammars of NotPetya? We would be unwise to wholly rely on propositions, but should 
assess how grammars come to be enacted. As the potential for greater abstraction enabled through machine learning algorithms 
in both offensive and defensive practice grows, the role, and politics, of cybersecurity will become more complex. Geopolitics 
is already grappling with these and grammars may offer one path forward that listens when computation “speaks” back.
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ENDNOTES
 1 The deconstruction of software into its “assembly,” the lowest human- readable abstraction of code from digital binary.
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 2 Names are pseudonyms.
 3 These are known as endpoint protection, or “anti- virus,” vendors.
 4 “Backdoor” is a term used when the user or operator of a computer or system is unaware of a “secret” access route to that computer or system.
 5 EternalBlue is a hacking tool that was released by the “ShadowBrokers” group, purportedly by Russian state hackers, after this was respectively 
hacked from the US National Security Agency.
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